

## THE DYNAMICS OF INDONESIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (1945–2002)

Miftah Rezki Amalia, Valen Glentino Moncai,  
Levidimas Kusuma Admaja, Moh Rosyidin, Amri

History Education Study Program,

Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Tadulako University, Indonesia

Email: [miftahrezkiamalia@gmail.com](mailto:miftahrezkiamalia@gmail.com), [moncaivalen995@gmail.com](mailto:moncaivalen995@gmail.com),  
[levidimas0922@gmail.com](mailto:levidimas0922@gmail.com), [Rosyidin151@gmail.com](mailto:Rosyidin151@gmail.com), [amrikharisma712@gmail.com](mailto:amrikharisma712@gmail.com)

### Abstrak

#### Keywords:

Constitution,  
Amendments,  
Distribution of Power,  
Reform.

*This study aims to analyze the dynamics of Indonesia's constitutional system through a historical review of constitutional changes during the 1945–2002 period and their implications for the distribution of state power. The constitution is conceptualized as a social contract and the supreme instrument for regulating and limiting power to prevent absolutism. However, history demonstrates that Indonesian constitutional practice has experienced extreme centralization of power, particularly during the eras of Guided Democracy and the New Order, where the mechanisms of checks and balances suffered systemic paralysis due to executive dominance (executive heavy). The research methodology employed is normative legal research utilizing historical, legislative, and conceptual approaches. The results indicate that the amendments to the 1945 Constitution (1999–2002) served as a momentum for a total correction of the governmental system toward a more democratic and accountable order. A fundamental implication of this transformation is a more proportional redistribution of power through the strengthening of the legislative function (DPR), the independence of the judiciary marked by the establishment of the Constitutional Court, and a shift in supremacy from the MPR toward the supremacy of the constitution. These changes strategically close the avenues for the resurgence of authoritarian practices and guarantee the protection of human rights within the framework of a modern constitutional state (rechtsstaat).*

*This is an open access article under the [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) license*



## INTRODUCTION

In a democratic state, a constitution is not merely a formal legal document; rather, it is a social contract that serves as the primary instrument for regulating and limiting governmental power. As the supreme law, the 1945 Constitution plays a crucial role as a control system for power organizations to prevent the emergence of absolutism or tyranny. This is predicated on the principle that, without strict limitations, power possesses a natural tendency toward abuse. As emphasized in the discourse of constitutionalism, according to Wutsqah (2024:772), 'the constitution is the supreme legal document that functions as a control system for power organizations'. Furthermore, within the framework of a constitutional state (*rechtsstaat*), the law must serve as the supreme authority aimed at creating order and justice for all citizens (Rokilah, 2020:14-15).

However, the constitutional history of Indonesia demonstrates that the existence of a constitution does not always correlate directly with democratic practice. The constitution in Indonesia is a product of highly fluid political dynamics, where every change to the fundamental law has been triggered by major political momentum, spanning from the revolutionary era (1945–1959) to the *Reformasi* era. During the early period of independence, Indonesia experimented with a responsive model of liberal democracy, which subsequently shifted drastically during the eras of Guided Democracy (1959–1965) and the New Order (1966–1998). In these periods, a distortion of democratic principles occurred, wherein power was centrally concentrated in the figure of the President. During the New Order, for instance, the power structure resembled a tapering pyramid, where the entire policy domain rested in the hands of a single individual (Chafid, 2021). Consequently, this condition resulted in the paralysis of the checks and balances mechanism, despite the fact that the division of power and mutual oversight among state institutions are essential for the preservation of human rights (Zaini, 2020).

The disparity between the constitutional text and the reality of power in the past underscores the importance of instilling the spirit of constitutionalism. The concept of constitutionalism emphasizes that a democratic government is one with limited authority and is not justified in acting arbitrarily (Wutsqah, 2024:774). Consequently, the 1998 *Reformasi* movement emerged as a momentum for constitutional reconstruction to fundamentally correct the structural weaknesses of the 1945 Constitution through four stages of amendments (1999–2002). This fundamental change aimed to realize the desired legal order (*ius constituendum*), specifically a more accountable system with a proportional redistribution of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Based on this background, this article will analyze how the dynamics of these historical constitutional changes have implications for the shift in the distribution of state power toward more democratic and constitutional governance.

## RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a normative legal research method, also known as doctrinal research, which focuses on the analysis of legal norms, constitutional principles, and historical documents of the state. In accordance with the study's focus on the dynamics of the constitutional system, the approaches applied include a historical approach to trace the evolution of the constitution from 1945 to 2002, a statute approach to examine

the text of the 1945 Constitution along with its amendments, and a conceptual approach to dissect the doctrine of the limitation of power and the mechanisms of checks and balances. The elaboration of this method aligns with the framework that the constitution functions as an instrument for controlling power organizations, which must be understood through an in-depth analysis of legal texts (Wutsqah, 2024).

The data utilized in this study consist entirely of secondary data sourced from library research, encompassing primary legal materials such as constitutional texts and statutory regulations, as well as secondary legal materials including academic journals, historical literature, and relevant previous research findings. All collected data are classified based on the historical periodization of the Indonesian constitutional system and subsequently subjected to descriptive-analytical analysis. Through this analytical technique, the authors conduct qualitative interpretations to reveal how political momentum in each period influenced the shift in the distribution of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, thereby facilitating conclusions regarding Indonesia's transformation toward a more democratic and accountable constitutional state (*rechtsstaat*).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### A. Constitutional Dynamics (1945–1959)

According to Peggy Angraini and Wardah Yuspin (2022:61), 'the periodization of constitutional validity in Indonesia, as a part of the history of political and constitutional development, is linked to significant and fundamental political momentum that profoundly influences a country's political system.

The constitution in Indonesia did not emerge in a vacuum; rather, it is a product of crucial political dynamics. Every transition of the fundamental law ranging from the 1945 Constitution and the RIS Constitution to the Provisional Constitution (UUDS) has invariably been triggered by significant political momentum, such as the independence revolution or power transitions. This underscores that the constitution serves as a reflection of the political consensus of its era; when fundamental shifts occur in the landscape of power or national aspirations, the governing rules of the state (the constitution) undergo a transformation to legitimize this new direction.

The history of the constitution and the political system reflects a profound cause-and-effect relationship. The authors emphasize that political momentum is not merely a background element, but a determinant factor that shapes the framework of the governmental system and the distribution of power in Indonesia. By understanding this periodization, we can observe a pattern in which every constitutional change aims to align the state structure with the requirements of political stability during a specific era. In short, Indonesia's constitutional history is a narrative of how the nation continuously seeks a balance between the law and dynamic political realities. The detailed stages are categorized as follows:

- a. Period I (1945-1959) was characterized by the alternating implementation of three constitutions: the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia (RIS), and the 1950 Provisional Constitution (UUDS). This era is recognized as a phase of revolution and liberal democracy, as the political system provided extensive space for participation by political parties and representative institutions. The political configuration during this period was relatively democratic, marked by political competition and parliamentary mechanisms. These

conditions, in turn, influenced the character of the resulting legal products, which were generally responsive to social dynamics and aspirations (Peggy Angraini and Wardah Yuspin, 2022).

Period I (1945-1959) served as an experimental phase in the formation of the Indonesian constitutional system, during which the state was still searching for the constitutional form and democratic model best suited to the national character. The succession of three constitution the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 RIS Constitution, and the 1950 Provisional Constitution (UUDS) demonstrates highly fluid political dynamics while reflecting a process of adaptation to both internal and external pressures post-independence. The parliamentary system implemented during the era of liberal democracy provided extensive space for political competition, allowing political parties to play a dominant role in determining the direction of government. In this context, the relatively democratic political configuration resulted in the emergence of more responsive legal products, as state policies were heavily influenced by debates and aspirations within the parliament. However, conversely, high political fragmentation also led to cabinet instability, illustrating that the procedural democracy developing at that time was not yet fully balanced by effective governmental stability.

- b. Period II (1959-1966) marked the end of the relatively democratic political configuration. This phase was inaugurated by the issuance of the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, which served as a turning point toward the implementation of the Guided Democracy system. Within this system, the decision-making process and the direction of state policy were centralized under the national leader, President Sukarno. Consequently, the evolving political structure exhibited authoritarian tendencies, as governmental dynamics and policy formulation were heavily influenced by a single central figure. This condition resulted in the weakening of other state institutions within the mechanisms of oversight and the balance of power (Yukalypta Ridwan, 2018:36).

Period II (1959-1966) served as a phase of executive power consolidation that shifted the trajectory of Indonesian democratic development from a pluralistic parliamentary model toward a more centralized and personalistic system. The Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, was not merely a constitutional step to resolve political deadlock but also provided legitimacy for the restructuring of state power distribution, which became increasingly concentrated in the presidency. Within the framework of Guided Democracy under Sukarno's leadership, state decision-making mechanisms were predominantly dictated by the leader's political will rather than institutional deliberative processes. This led to the erosion of the principles of checks and balances, as the legislature and other state institutions no longer functioned independently. Consequently, this period reflects a shift from procedural democracy toward an authoritarian political configuration, which ultimately triggered structural tensions within the Indonesian constitutional system.

- c. Period III (1966-1998) was characterized by a political configuration built upon the discourse of national development and an orientation toward economic growth. To establish a strong and stable state, the political structure was engineered to ensure national stability as a prerequisite for successful economic development. Political stability was strictly maintained by suppressing potential conflict and opposition. However, in its progression, political development during the New Order era

gradually gave rise to an authoritarian system that bordered on totalitarianism. The executive branch wielded highly dominant power, while press freedom was restricted and faced the threat of revocation of publishing licenses (*pembredelan*) if deemed contrary to government policy (Safitri, 2022:38).

Period III (1966-1998) can be interpreted as a phase of power institutionalization that positioned stability and economic development as the primary legitimacy for strengthening state authority. Under the leadership of Suharto during the New Order regime, national development was employed as a dominant narrative to justify the restructuring of a political system increasingly concentrated within the executive branch. National stability was understood not merely as an orderly political condition, but as a mechanism for strict control over opposition, criticism, and the dynamics of civil society. Within this framework, the mechanisms of checks and balances underwent systemic weakening, while press freedom and political participation were restricted through regulations and the practice of *pembredelan* (revocation of publishing licenses). Consequently, this period reflects a paradox between successful economic development and the narrowing of democratic space, which ultimately led to an accumulation of socio-political dissatisfaction toward the end of the New Order era.

- d. Period IV (1998-present) commenced in 1998 as the Reformation era (*Reformasi*), emerging as a historical necessity when the Indonesian nation resolved to rectify the system of state governance. Political reform became a strategic step to restructure the previously highly centralized power framework and constitutional practices. The success of this reform is evident in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which served as part of a new trajectory for national legal policy. While the 1945 Constitution was treated as a sacred, unalterable document during the New Order administration, the Reformation era saw the pivotal political decision to pursue constitutional change. Consequently, the primary agenda of legal policy during the Reformation era was to revise the 1945 Constitution to establish a more democratic and balanced constitutional system (Ahsanul Ibad, 2017:49-50).

Period IV (1998-present) can be interpreted as a momentum of constitutional reconstruction, marking a shift in Indonesia's constitutional paradigm from a centralized power model toward a system that is more democratic and based on the limitation of power. The Reformation (*Reformasi*) was not merely a change of regime but a historical correction to the governing practices of the New Order era, which had treated the 1945 Constitution as a document nearly immune to change. Through the amendments to the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002), the state reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of modern constitutionalism, such as presidential term limits, the strengthening of the legislative branch, and the establishment of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, the Reformation represents a fundamental transformation of legal policy moving from the sacralization of the constitution toward its rationalization and democratization as an instrument for a more balanced and accountable distribution of power.

### ***B. The Guided Democracy Period (1959–1965)***

Guided Democracy is a system of government in which the national leader wields highly dominant authority in determining the direction and controlling the dynamics of politics. Although it retains democratic elements such as deliberation (*musyawarah*), the exercise of power in this system is more centralized within a specific

figure or political force. This leadership structure plays a major role in regulating the course of governance and formulating public policy. The stated objective is typically to maintain political stability and minimize the potential for conflict within society. However, a high concentration of power frequently results in the limited role of other institutions within the decision-making process (Yuwono, 2024).

Purnamawati (2020:256) outlines the features of a political system as follows:

The political system during this period was characterized by presidential dominance, the limited role of political parties, the burgeoning influence of communism, and the expanding role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) as a socio-political force. In practice, the administration engaged in numerous distortions of democratic principles. The Presidential Decree of July 5, while framed as an attempt to resolve the political deadlock within the Constitutional Assembly, is regarded as a significant deviation from democratic practices. Furthermore, although the 1945 Constitution stipulates a five-year presidential term, the MPRS Decree No. III/1963 which appointed Sukarno as President for Life effectively nullified this constitutional limit. Sukarno's Guided Democracy was not a true democracy, but rather a form of authoritarianism that failed to reflect the core essence of democratic values. The era of Guided Democracy ultimately concluded following the September 30th Movement (G30S/PKI).

The era of Guided Democracy witnessed a fundamental shift in the configuration of Indonesia's political system, characterized by the president's profound dominance over the state's entire decision-making process. Under Sukarno's leadership, the role of political parties was significantly marginalized, while the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) burgeoned within national political dynamics. Concurrently, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) secured a strategic position, serving not only as a defense force but also as a socio-political entity. The combination of these three factors illustrates a shift toward the centralization of power and a diminishing mechanism of checks and balances among state institutions.

In constitutional practice, various policies during this era can be regarded as distortions of the principles of constitutional democracy. While the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, was intended as a solution to the political deadlock within the Constitutional Assembly, it simultaneously terminated the parliamentary democratic process unilaterally. Furthermore, the provisions in the 1945 Constitution which limit the presidential term to five years rendered ineffective after the MPRS, through Decree No. III/MPRS/1963, appointed Sukarno as President for Life. This decision substantively nullified the principle of the limitation of power, which is a fundamental characteristic of modern democratic systems.

Consequently, Guided Democracy reflects a consolidation of executive power rather than the genuine practice of democratic principles. This system failed to fully manifest democratic values, such as free political competition, limited circulation of power, and effective mechanisms of checks and balances. The political tensions accumulated throughout this period ultimately culminated in the September 30th Movement of 1965 (G30S), which signaled the end of the Guided Democracy era and paved the way for a major transformation within the Indonesian constitutional system.

### ***C. The New Order's Constitutional System***

According to Chafid (2021:1322), 'during the New Order (Orba) era, the presidential power structure was depicted as an upward-tapering pyramid, wherein all political decisions and government policies fell within the domain of a single individual, namely President Soeharto.

The pyramid-shaped power structure that tapered toward the top during the New Order era reflects a highly centralized system of governance, in which political control was not distributed equitably but was instead concentrated at a single apex. Within this model, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches tended to function as supporters of central policy rather than as mechanisms of checks and balances. This created a rigid hierarchy where instructions flowed strictly from the top down, effectively minimizing the space for opposition or critical public participation in strategic national decision-making.

The absolute dominance of President Soeharto within the policy domain indicates that the political stability of that era was constructed upon a foundation of personalistic authoritarianism. With total control concentrated in a single individual, the administration's effectiveness appeared remarkably stable on the surface; however, this came at the expense of democratic principles, as policies were frequently formulated without an inclusive discursive process. Consequently, the nation's trajectory for decades was heavily contingent upon the leader's personal vision and discretion, which ultimately shaped an Indonesian political character defined by uniformity and adherence to central command.

Through Ministerial Regulation Number 12 of 1969, the government mandated all civil servants to support Golkar and assigned military officers to manage the various regional branches of the Golkar Joint Secretariat. This policy effectively expanded the organization's influence down to the grassroots and remote areas. Such a political strategy is known as the policy of mono-loyalty, which demanded the singular allegiance of state apparatuses to the government. This policy proved instrumental in securing Golkar's victory in the 1971 Election, where they obtained a landslide majority, winning 236 out of the 360 contested seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) (Yusdiyanto, 2013:165).

Furthermore, the consolidation of political parties into three major forces—nationalist, spiritual, and functional groups constituted a strategic political simplification intended to facilitate state control over the opposition. By compelling diverse ideologies into these narrower frameworks, President Soeharto successfully neutralized potential inter-party conflicts while simultaneously eroding the traditional grassroots bases of major legacy parties. This fragmentation of political power was deliberately engineered to ensure that no single group could challenge the dominance of Golongan Karya, which was fully bolstered by the executive and military power structures (Yusdiyanto, 2013).

The formalization of this structure through Law No. 3 of 1975 created a political stability that was superficial yet remarkably resilient for over two decades. This legal framework served as a strategic instrument to maintain the three-party system comprising two political parties and one functional group (*Golongan Karya*) which endured until the regime's collapse in 1998. An interpretation of this series of policies demonstrates that the New Order successfully achieved a robust institutionalization of power, wherein law and bureaucracy were integrated to preclude the emergence of new political forces that could jeopardize the government's status quo (Yusdiyanto, 2013).

#### ***D. Amandemen UUD 1945 (1999-2002)***

The 1945 Constitution serves as both the foundational document and the supreme law of Indonesia. Historically, this constitution has undergone four amendments, specifically in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. This series of amendments has

brought significant consequences for Indonesia's constitutional system. These changes are evident in the restructuring of state institutions, encompassing the adjustment of mandates and inter-institutional relations, the establishment of new bodies, and the dissolution of pre-existing ones. This dynamic is inextricably linked to the evolution of Indonesian political life and democracy, which has undergone continuous transformation over time. Fundamentally, all these changes were directed toward realizing an aspired legal order (*ius constituendum*) namely, a constitutional system that is more democratic, constitutional, and balanced in the distribution of state power (Rizky et al., 2021:28-29).

The fourfold amendment of the 1945 Constitution between 1999 and 2002 represents a fundamental turning point in Indonesian legal history, wherein the constitution was no longer viewed as a static document, but rather as a dynamic instrument responding to the demands of the *Reformasi* movement. The restructuring of state institutions through the dissolution, adjustment, and establishment of new bodies such as the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission demonstrates a systematic effort to dismantle the previously over-centralized power model. These changes marked a shift from the supremacy of the MPR toward the supremacy of the constitution, ensuring that each branch of power has clear limitations and remains subordinate to the higher rule of law.

At a deeper level, this series of amendments serves as a manifestation of the pursuit of *ius constituendum* the envisioned legal order aimed at establishing substantial democracy. By distributing power more equitably through a mechanism of checks and balances, the amended constitution seeks to prevent the resurgence of the authoritarianism that was deeply rooted in the past. This dynamic reflects the nation's commitment to building a more accountable constitutional system, wherein the protection of human rights and popular sovereignty constitute the core of modern and constitutional state governance.

The *Reformasi* movement, which commenced in 1998, triggered fundamental changes in Indonesia's constitutional order through the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This constitutional reform process was initiated during the 1999 MPR General Session and continued consistently through a series of MPR Annual Sessions in 2000 and 2001, concluding in 2002. This sequence of amendments represents a juridical response aimed at rectifying the weaknesses of the previous governance system to better align with the *zeitgeist* or the spirit of the times (Sugiman, 2020:175).

One of the most significant impacts of the shifting political landscape following the *Reformasi* era is the repositioning of the legislative branch. These constitutional amendments successfully transformed the House of Representatives (DPR) into a substantially more democratic institution with a high degree of accountability. Equipped with broader and more balanced authorities, the DPR now functions as a supervisory pillar that ensures governance remains within the corridors of popular sovereignty, thereby preventing the recurrence of absolute power (Sugiman, 2020:175).

The series of amendments to the 1945 Constitution, conducted incrementally from 1999 to 2002, constitutes a total correction of the structural weaknesses in the former constitution that tended to facilitate absolute power. This reform process, carried out through MPR Sessions, marks a transition from an executive-heavy system toward one that upholds the supremacy of law and the limitation of powers. By undertaking these constitutional renewals, Indonesia has successfully established a new legal

foundation that is more adaptive to modern democratic values, while ensuring that the future state order no longer relies on the individual discretion of a leader, but rather on a written and transparent rule of the game.

The post-*Reformasi* restructuring of the House of Representatives (DPR) reflects an effort to strengthen popular sovereignty through a more independent and empowered representative body. The transformation of the DPR from an institution previously regarded as a mere supporter of government policy into an accountable supervisory pillar serves as a primary key in the mechanism of checks and balances. Equipped with more robust legislative, budgetary, and oversight authorities, the DPR now functions as an effective counterweight to executive power. This strategically closes the loopholes for the resurgence of authoritarianism and ensures that every state policy must undergo a democratic public discursive process, remaining fully accountable to the people.

## CONCLUSION

The dynamics of Indonesia's constitutional system between 1945 and 2002 reflect a long journey toward democratic maturity and the strengthening of constitutionalist principles. Based on a historical review, it can be concluded that prior to the *Reformasi* era, Indonesia's fundamental legal structure possessed fundamental weaknesses that enabled the emergence of absolute and centralized power, both during the Guided Democracy and the New Order periods. This was driven by an executive-heavy dominance that paralyzed the mechanisms of checks and balances, causing the constitution to function more as an instrument of political legitimation rather than a limitation of power.

The momentum of the 1945 Constitutional amendments from 1999 to 2002 served as a crucial turning point for a total correction of the distribution of state power. Through a more proportional redistribution of authority, there was a significant strengthening of legislative functions (DPR) and the independence of judicial power through the establishment of the Constitutional Court. This transformation fundamentally shifted the paradigm from the supremacy of the MPR toward the supremacy of the constitution, ensuring that each branch of power is mutually supervisory and bound by law. Consequently, this transformation not only closed the loopholes for the resurgence of authoritarianism but also laid the foundation for a legal state (*rechtsstaat*) that is more democratic, accountable, and committed to the protection of human rights in the future.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Angraini, P., & Yuspin, W. (2022). The Dynamics of Political Configuration and the Character of Legal Products during the Era of Democratic Governance in Indonesia. *Jurnal Politik dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan*, 14(1).
- Ahsanul Ibad. (2017). The Legal Politics of State Funding for Political Parties in Realizing Substantial Democracy.
- Chafid, M. (2021). Dharmasisya: The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Term Limits Under Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution Prior to the Amendments Regarding Presidential Continuism. *Jurnal Program Magister Hukum Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia*.
- Isnaeni, B. (2021). Trias Politica and Its Implications for the State Institutional Structure under the Post-Amendment 1945 Constitution. *Vi*(2), 78–91.



- Purnamawati, E. (2020). The Journey of Democracy in Indonesia. 18, 251–264.
- Rizky, K., Lutpi, D., Malik, U. S., Tinggi, S., & Pasundan, H. (2021). The Urgency of the Fifth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution for the Indonesian Constitutional System. *Jurnal Rechten: Riset Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia*, 3(3), 28–32.
- Rokilah. (2020). The Dynamics of the Indonesian Legal State: Between *Rechtsstaat* and the Rule of Law. *Jurnal Ilmu Hukum*, 2(1), 12–22.
- Safitri, N. I. (2022). The Influence of Political Configuration on Legal Products in Indonesia (A Review of the Criminal Code Bill/RUU KUHP).
- Sugiman. (2020). The Legislative Function of the House of Representatives (DPR) Following the Amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. *Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum Dirgantara–Fakultas Hukum Universitas Dirgantara Marsekal Suryadarma*, 10(2), 173–182.
- Tobing, D. R. L., & Silalahi, W. (2025). A Comparison of the Indonesian Governance System under the Original 1945 Constitution and Post-Amendment: Implications for the Distribution of Power and the Principles of Checks and Balances. *Jurnal Pustaka Cendekia Hukum dan Ilmu Sosial*, 3(2), 159–169.
- Wutsqah, U. (2024). The Discourse on the Limitation of Power in Indonesia within the Perspective of the Constitution and Constitutionalism. *Jurnal Citizenship Virtues*, 4(2), 771–784.
- Ridwan, Y. (2018). The Political Configuration of the House of Representatives (DPR) in the Approval Process of Government Regulations in Lieu of Laws (Perpu) into Laws.
- Yusdiyanto. (2013). An Analysis of the Political Party Regime within the Dynamics of the Indonesian Constitutional System. *Jurnal Ilmu Hukum*, 7(2), 160–167.
- Yuwono, A. T. (2024). Driving Factors for Nahdlatul Ulama in Adopting President Soekarno’s Concept of Guided Democracy (1959–1965). *Journal of Nahdlatul Ulama and Contemporary Islamic Studies*, 2(2), 399–416.
- Zaini, A. (2020). The Legal State, Democracy, and Human Rights. *Jurnal Hukum dan Politik*, 11, 13–48.